AUSSOM at a crossroads: Somalia’s fragile mission in the balance - Eigenrac analysis

A recent donor event secured new pledges, but persistent funding gaps, Egypt–Ethiopia rivalry, Turkey’s expanding role, and U.S. retrenchment under Trump’s “America First” policy place the mission under severe strain. Its future will shape the Horn of Africa’s security and Europe’s exposure to maritime instability, migration, and terrorism. 

What’s at stake?

On September 25, 2025, the AU, UN, Somali government, and UK co-hosted a financing event at the UN General Assembly in New York. Italy, Japan, South Korea, and Spain contributed funds, while the EU is expected to support the $20 million that the AU and £16.5 million that the UK committed.  However, authorities acknowledged that there is still a £22 million deficit.  Leaders from the AU and UN warned that without consistent, long-term support, the mission may fail.

The warning comes in an already violent year that has seen Al Shabaab intensify its offensive.  Twenty recruits were killed by a suicide bombing at the Damaanyo military base in Mogadishu, and 21 people, including elders in charge of local defence, were killed during a hotel siege in Beledweyne earlier this year as well.  A strike on U.S. forces at Kismayo airport highlighted Somalia's vulnerability, while militants overran a garrison in Ceeldheer, seizing supplies and vehicles.  These incidents demonstrate that militants can still destabilise both rural and urban areas in the absence of a significant AU presence.

The background

AUSSOM was established in January 2025 as a leaner version of ATMIS/AMISOM, but it was still charged with securing critical infrastructure, assisting the Somali Security Forces (SSF), and degrading Al-Shabaab.  It operates in five sectors, with a phased drawdown aimed at Somali self-reliance by 2029.

Donor fatigue is glaring despite September's pledges, with the UK having acknowledged a £22 million shortfall. Operational planning is undermined by the fact that many contributions are still one-time rather than consistent over several years.  UN and AU officials have cautioned that if funding sources fail, troop logistics and salaries could be jeopardised.

Regional dynamics

Ethiopia is a major troop contributor, but it is cautious of Egyptian deployments because it views them as destabilising and linked to the geopolitics of the Nile Basin amid tensions surrounding the GERD development. Additionally, Addis Ababa conducts unilateral actions outside of AU coordination. Addis has hinted it may reconsider its own commitments if Egyptian deployments expand.

Egypt is now deploying troops under AUSSOM after finalising agreements with Mogadishu. Egyptian contingents are expected to take over positions in Sector Five (Middle Shabelle), including Bal’ad, Jowhar, and Mahaday, currently held by Burundian forces. Cairo frames this as support for Somalia’s stability, but critics see it as part of its strategic contest with Ethiopia. However, Somali leaders have openly denied that they will be used as a front in a proxy conflict.

Ankara is a longtime bilateral partner that invests in infrastructure, maintains a significant base in Mogadishu, and trains Somali special forces.  Although it complicates AU coordination, its expanding role gives Mogadishu alternatives.

Recalibration of the United States: US President Donald Trump has made it clear that the United States "will not police Somalia or Kenya." Washington is shrinking its footprint, prioritising a focus on intelligence assistance and targeted strikes. Recent airstrikes such as those near Badhan and on Al-Shabaab camps, demonstrate continued engagement, but with fewer resources on the ground.

Comment

AUSSOM is indispensable yet precarious. It stabilises Somalia's fragile transition, but ongoing underfunding erodes planning and troop morale.  International acknowledgement of the mission's importance does not yet translate into sustainable resourcing, as the September financing event demonstrated.

AUSSOM’s credibility also suffers from its uneven relationship with Somalia’s federal and regional authorities. Disputes between Mogadishu and federal member states such as Jubaland and Puntland undermine coordination, leaving gaps that Al-Shabaab readily exploits. For many Somalis, the mission is caught between being a stabiliser and a symbol of dependency, struggling to empower Somali forces while remaining an indispensable promise of security.

The U.S. withdrawal increases accountability for European and African donors.  The problem for Europe is serious: terrorism, migration, and maritime insecurity could spread without strong AU operations, but there is still little desire for greater engagement.  For Somalis, AUSSOM serves as a reminder of the state's vulnerability as well as a source of comfort against Al-Shabaab.

Assessment / Outlook

With the help of recent donor commitments, AUSSOM should be able to maintain its position in the near term, but operational constraints brought on by budget deficits will continue.  Al-Shabaab will most likely keep carrying out asymmetrical attacks, such as raids in central Somalia and suicide bombings in Mogadishu, in an effort to test the resolve of the AU and Somali people.

Looking ahead, if donor fatigue persists, there is a real chance that the mission will be reduced too soon.  Somalia's security forces are unlikely to be fully responsible by 2029 due to the country's unresolved conflicts between the federal government and its regions and its sluggish institutional reform.  AU cohesion and Mogadishu's balancing act will be made more difficult by the escalating regional rivalries, which include Ethiopia's resistance, Egypt's ambitions for influence, and Turkey's growing involvement.

The stakes are high for Europe and other partners. In addition to giving Al-Shabaab more confidence, a weakened AUSSOM would raise the risks to Red Sea trade and encourage migration northward, highlighting the close connection between Somalia's stability and wider international security.

Conclusion

AUSSOM embodies both the promise and limits of African-led stabilisation. It is essential in holding back Al-Shabaab and enabling fragile Somali governance, yet its survival depends on reliable funding and regional consensus. Turkey’s rise and the Egypt–Ethiopia tug-of-war complicate AU unity, while U.S. retrenchment shifts responsibility toward Africa and Europe. For Somalia, the mission is a lifeline. For the West, it is a warning: failure to sustain AUSSOM risks reverberations across the Horn, the Red Sea, and into Europe’s own security corridors.

This report is compiled by Eigenrac is a Dubai-based boutique consultancy specialising in security risk management services, with a global presence and deep understanding of complex business risk environments. Eigenrac acts as a trusted enabler for clients operating in high-risk or demanding settings.