Ghana, Cote d'Ivoire under threat as Sahel insurgencies creep south: Eigenrac analysis

TLDR: An attack in northern Côte d’Ivoire is a warning of how Sahel instability is now penetrating coastal West Africa. Benin, Togo, and Ghana are already facing escalating violence, displacement, and cross-border threats. For Europe and the wider West, the southward push of extremist networks raises questions of migration, humanitarian crises, and a widening arc of insecurity along the Gulf of Guinea.

What’s at stake?

It was more than a local tragedy when four villagers were killed by armed men in the Ivorian town of Difita, which is close to the Burkina Faso border.  It indicated that the thin border that once divided the states of the Gulf of Guinea from the insurgencies of the Sahel is gradually eroding.  Having not experienced a fatal attack linked to jihadists since 2021 (attribution of the August attack is still being investigated), Côte d’Ivoire is now faced with renewed militant incursions along its northern border.

However, the implications go beyond national borders. There is also an increase in violence and instability in Ghana, Togo, and Benin.  These states work together to create a frontline against the southward movement of organisations such as Islamic State affiliates and Jama’a Nusrat ul-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM).  The risk profile for investors, humanitarian organisations, and international partners is drastically changing as violence approaches ports, commercial centres, and political capitals.

The background

The security situation along West Africa's coast has worsened in recent months.  In 2025, Benin—once thought of as a relatively safe area—saw its deadliest terrorist attack ever.  Twelve people were killed when suspected jihadists ambushed park rangers and security personnel in Pendjari National Park in July.  There is a pattern to this:  In 2023, there were 171 extremist attacks in Benin; since then, the violence has only increased, causing widespread displacement in the country's northern regions.

Lethal incursions have also occurred in Togo.  On May 10-11, eight soldiers were killed when JNIM-affiliated militants stormed a military outpost close to the Burkina Faso border.  The attack demonstrated how militants are undermining local security forces' credibility by testing state capabilities in border areas.  In 2023 alone, Togo saw 14 attacks and 66 fatalities; this trend is expected to continue in 2025.

Ghana, so far spared from major attacks, continues to play an increasingly dangerous role.  According to reports, militants take advantage of porous borders in northern Ghana to resupply, receive medical care, and handle logistics.  Although authorities deny allegations that Ghana is used as a "supply line" for extremists, the country's northern districts are home to more than 15,000 Burkinabe refugees, placing a strain on resources and raising concerns about radicalisation.

On top of all of this is a humanitarian crisis: by early 2025, over 160,000 people had fled the violence in Burkina Faso to neighbouring Ghana, Togo, Côte d’Ivoire, and Benin.  Resentment is growing, while infrastructure and host communities are overburdened.  Political instability is being exacerbated by the humanitarian crisis as Sahelian violence spreads southward.

Comment: coastal state defences under strain

A structural change in regional security is reflected in the southward movement of Sahelian insurgencies.  Extremist organisations are now openly targeting coastal states rather than scouring the borders.  Attacks like Togo's outpost raid and Benin's Pendjari massacre show that militants are looking for both propaganda value and territorial depth.

 Support from international partners is increasing.  Coastal state security forces now receive more funding, training, and intelligence sharing from the US, France, and EU.  However, there are still significant local capacity gaps.  Uneven coordination persists among Benin, Togo, Ghana, and Côte d’Ivoire, and internal politics - especially surrounding elections and governance challenges- run the risk of diverting attention from a collaborative and comprehensive security plan.

For Western governments, the stakes are high. The Gulf of Guinea is a critical trade corridor and investment destination. Similar to the political collapse in the Sahel, a destabilised coastal belt may encourage migration northward, interfere with supply chains, and create an environment conducive to further coups.

Assessment: near- and medium-term projections

Attacks in Benin and Togo's border areas are likely to continue in the near future as militants take advantage of vulnerable borders and overburdened military personnel.  There is a realistic possibility of intermittent incursions into Côte d’Ivoire, though Abidjan will seek to contain violence north of key commercial zones. Although there is a realistic chance of escalation due to the existence of militant logistics networks and refugee pressures, Ghana is still less vulnerable to direct attacks in the short term.

Like central Mali, northern Benin and Togo run the risk of becoming semi-permanent militant operating zones as a result of entrenched violence in the medium term.  Diplomatic and investor confidence may drastically change if Ghana is the target of any significant attack.  A growing security void along its southern flank, increased migration pressure, and heavier humanitarian burdens are all consequences of this trajectory for Europe.  The trajectory of violence indicates that coastal West Africa is entering a new and more dangerous phase of the Sahel conflict, despite increased external support.

Conclusion

The attack in northern Ivory Coast is not an isolated event but a symptom of a broader regional trend: the Sahel insurgency is pushing south, and coastal states are under mounting pressure. Benin and Togo are already suffering, Ghana is under strain, and Côte d’Ivoire is once again vulnerable. The Gulf of Guinea runs the risk of inheriting the Sahel's crisis and becoming a new epicentre of instability if regional governments and their international allies fail to bridge the gap between rhetoric and capability.

This report is compiled by Eigenrac is a Dubai-based boutique consultancy specialising in security risk management services, with a global presence and deep understanding of complex business risk environments. Eigenrac acts as a trusted enabler for clients operating in high-risk or demanding settings.